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A ‘Guildian’ Analysis of The Equivocal Trusted 
Sponsorship under EU Labour Migration Law  
 
 
Tesseltje de Lange∗  
 
 
This contribution applies a ‘Guildian’ analysis of the institution of the trusted sponsor 
in the European Union and its Member States. A Guildian analysis is to place the mi-
grants’ perspective central.1 Elspeth Guild studied power relations between states, third 
parties and migrants with an eye for the ‘professional futures of the individuals invol-
ved’.2 The Guildian analysis considers the extent to which the individual labour migrant 
‘alone can regulate his or her life in accordance with clear rules with a degree of security 
as to the consequences of any particular choice or action’.3 This analysis is applied to 
the instrument of trusted sponsorship, or recognized employer, which is incorporated 
in two Directives and one proposed Directive on highly skilled migration of third-
country nationals coming into the EU. These Directives are on the entry of Students, 
Researchers and some others,4 the Intra-Corporate Transfers Directive5 and the pro-
posed recast of the Blue Card Directive.6 I will give some insights into the drafting 
history with respect to the concept of the trusted sponsor in each Directive, the requi-
rements for trusted sponsors, the costs and benefits that come with being a trusted 
sponsor and, most relevant to the Guildian analysis, the consequences of a failing 
trusted sponsor for the migrant.  
Other perspectives on labour migration are those of the host state, which has to 
secure its labour market from imbalances resulting from unwanted migration and might 
need to cure labour market shortages. The interest of an individual European Union 
Member State does not necessarily coincide with the European Unions’ point of view, 
for one because labour markets are not equally needing of migrant workers throughout 
                                                        
∗  University of Amsterdam. 
1  E. Guild, European Community Law from A Migrant’s Perspective, PhD Radboud University Nijmegen, 
Nijmegen: GNI 2000.  
2  E. Guild, ‘Equivocal Claims? Ambivalent Controls? Labour Migration Regimes in the European Un-
ion’, in: E. Guild & S. Mantu, Constructing and Imagining Labour Migration. Perspectives of Control from Five 
Continents, Farnham: Ashgate 2011, p. 207-228 at p. 223. 
3  Guild 2000, p. 314. 
4  Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au 
pairing, 2016/801/EU of 11 May 2016 
5  Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the con-
ditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate trans-
fer.  
6  Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment. 
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the Union. Obviously, there is a business perspective to have readily available the wor-
kers needed to deliver.7 Both Member States and businesses may be competing for the 
same international talent, or Member States compete over businesses whereby easy 
access to labour migrants is a ‘country branding’ tool. Another perspective is that of 
the country of origin, which may benefit from labour migration through remittances 
or so called brain circulation.8 This is not some futuristic artificial intelligence concept 
where brains are linked into a circuit,9 but, in the words of Vertovec, an alternative 
discourse to the much feared brain drain; brain circulation describes labour migration 
‘within transnational networks of skilled workers… throughout an international arena 
(such as Indian IT workers who work, at one time or another, in Singapore, Australia 
and the USA, as well as in India)... The idea is to accept the fact that skilled persons 
may want to migrate for career development, while seeking to encourage the skilled 
migrant’s return, mobilization or association with home country development.’ The 
circular perspective does aim to limit the migrants’ freedom to decide on saying yes or 
no. 
The study by Noronha, D’Cruz and Ul Lateef Banday10 shows how Indian IT wor-
kers embed in the Netherlands (of whom many live in Amstelveen, also called ‘Mumbai 
on the Amstel’11) are internationally wanted highly skilled labour migrants. However, 
they can see their freedom of choice and action restricted through migration law or 
their employers’ instrumental use of it. Noronha et al. describe how, for instance, em-
ployers make their Indian staff return to India before they have a full five years of 
employment, to avoid access to permanent residence and independency from their em-
ployer in their professional aspirations. The question addressed in this chapter is to 
what extent the instrument of the trusted sponsor or recognised employer allows the 
individual labour migrant to regulate his or her own life? I will argue that the instrument 
of trusted sponsorship is an equivocal instrument of facilitating and controlling large 
scale skilled labour migration. It is an enabler of labour migration. But also, and for 
this I will mainly use the Netherlands as an example, the instrument can seriously limit 
the migrants’ room for individual choices and actions.12  
                                                        
7  For a business perspective see S. Ramasamy, The Role of Employers and Employer Engagement in Labour 
Migration from Third Countries to the EU, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, 
No. 178, Paris: OECD Publishing 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jlwxc0366xr-en.  
8  S. Vertovec, Transnational Networks and Skilled Labour Migration, WPTC-02-02, Ladenburg, 14-15 Feb-
ruary 2002, Transnational Communities Programme, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002. 
9  See for instance SF-novel by Steve Toutonghi, Join, New York: Soho Press 2016. 
10  E. Noronha, P. D’Cruz & M. Ul Lateef Banday, ‘Navigating Embeddedness: Experiences of Indian 
IT Suppliers and Employees in the Netherlands’, Journal of Business Ethics 2018, p. 1-19, published 
online: https://doi.org/10/1007/s10551-018-4071-3. 
11  Financieel Dagblad, ‘Mumbai aan de Amstel barst uit zijn voegen’, 21 april 2019. 
12  The UK opted out of the EU labour migration directives discussed here. However, the so called points 
based system in use in the UK uses a similar instrument or ‘permissive action’ (T. de Lange, ‘The 
privatization of control over labour migration in the Netherlands: in whose interest?’, European Journal 
of Migration and Law 2011-2, p. 185-200) with employers having control over the migration manage-
ment process. The UK government (as the Dutch) generated considerable revenues from the spon-
sorship fees (F. Jurje, ‘The EU’s External Labour Mobility and Trade – a Multilayered Governance 
Approach?’, in: S. Carrera, L. den Hertog, M. Panizzon & D. Kostakopoulou (eds), EU External Mi-
gration Policies in an Era of Global Mobilities: Intersecting Policy Universes, Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 2019 (in the 
Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy Series edited by E. Guild & V.Mitsilegas), p. 218-219.  
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Three EU Directives and the Trusted Sponsor  
Students, Researchers and Some Other Directives 
Directive 2016/801/EU of 11 May 2016 sets conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals (meaning non-EU nationals) for the purposes of research, stu-
dies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and 
au pairing (SRD). I focus on students and researchers. Member States may approve 
hosting organisations for all of these categories, but for au pair bureaus.13 The original 
Commission proposal provided the option to approve a hosting organisation only for 
researchers.14 The extension of the concept of approved sponsor beyond the resear-
chers was the result of the political negotiations.15 Setting up such a procedure for 
others than researchers followed, amongst others, from Amendment 57 of the Euro-
pean Parliament concerning fast-track procedures.16 As a possible alternative to state 
approval of the sponsor up front, an amendment suggested host entities to be registe-
red in an accreditation system, in order to facilitate future application procedures.17 
Indeed, obligatory (private) accreditation is, in other domains of administrative law, a 
common tool to select ‘good’ government partners and the recognised sponsor shows 
some similarities to an accreditation systems.  
Member States are given the discretion to provide for an approval procedure in 
accordance with procedures set out in the national law or administrative practice.18 EU 
law does not set any conditions or limitations as to the characteristics of the sponsor. 
Applications for approval shall be made in accordance with those procedures and be 
based on their statutory tasks or corporate purposes as appropriate and on evidence 
that they conduct research. The reference to national law or administrative practice 
leaves the Member States a wide margin of discretion in the design of an approval 
procedure, if designed at all. The Directive does however require Member States to 
grant an organisation an approval for a minimum period of five years. Only in excep-
tional cases, may it be for a shorter period. Although the Directive does not articulate 
grounds for approval it does give facultative and non-limited grounds for refusal to 
renew or for withdrawal of the approval where, in the case of for instance research 
organisations.19 Member States may require migrants, their family members, or host 
entities to pay fees for the handling of notifications and applications. The level of such 
fees shall not be disproportionate or excessive.20  
                                                        
13  Article 15. Au pairs are not to be made subject to trusted sponsors because they are prone to abuse 
(preamble 23). Apparently, the Commission takes the view that highly skilled migrants are abuse re-
sistant. As the work of Noronha et al. (2018) shows, this does not always hold true. 
14  See for the proposal document COM(2013) 151 final – 2013/0081 COD) of 26 March 2013. The 
previous Researchers Directive 2005/71 included the obligation to recognize an institution, article 5.  
15  Brussels, 5 April 2016, COM(2016) 184 final, 2013/0081(COD), Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament pursuant to Article 294(6) of the TFEU. Political agreement was 
reached between co-legislators at the trialogue meeting of 17 November 2015, and was endorsed by 
COREPER on 25 November 2015, and by the LIBE Committee on 30 November 2015. 
16  Statement of the Council’s Reasons, 11 March 2015, Doc. no. 14958/2/15 REV 2 ADD 1, p. 9-10. 
17  Amendment 86 by MEP Hélène Flautre (Greens) suggesting an alternative Article 15 par. 1 a. 
18  Article 15 SRD. 
19  Article 9 SRD. 
20  Article 36 and Preamble 4 SRD. 
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The benefits of the approval are in the fast track application procedure, which is 
still long: 60 days instead of the standard 90 days.21 If applying to stay with an approved 
institution, the applicant shall be exempted from presenting to the Member States’ 
authorities one or more of the documents or evidence of their address in the Member 
States, their health insurance, payment of handling fees,22 proof of having sufficient 
resources to cover subsistence costs without having recourse to the social assistance 
system, as well as return travel costs. The assessment of these requirements is left to 
the host institution. The host will need to check for the availability of sufficient resour-
ces based on an individual examination of the case and shall take into account resources 
that derive, inter alia, from a grant, a scholarship or a fellowship or a valid work contract 
or a binding job offer. The approved research institution, in part, takes on the role of 
migration authority. 
The approved status can be withdrawn, for instance, when the organisation no 
longer conducts research, when it has not covered the costs of return of a migrant or 
when it failed to inform the authorities on time of the finalization of the research (and 
hence provide a reason for withdrawal of the residence permit of the migrant resear-
cher). Where an application for renewal has been refused or where the approval has 
been withdrawn, the organisation concerned may be banned from reapplying for ap-
proval for a period of up to five years from the date of publication of the decision on 
non-renewal or withdrawal.23 Sanctions against host entities who have not fulfilled their 
obligations under the Directive shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.24 Mem-
ber States have again been granted a rather wide margin of discretion to determine in 
their national law the sanctions and consequences of the withdrawal of the approval or 
the refusal to renew the approval for the existing hosting agreements, as well as the 
consequences for the researchers concerned. From a migrant rights perspective this is 
a missed opportunity for the EU to set minimum standards on the protection of re-
searchers, students and other wanted highly skilled migrants against their dependence 
on ‘failing’ institutions. Possibly article 33 (on proportionate sanctions) can be read as 
to be precluding sanctions that disproportionally hurt the migrant, but other than that, 
the Directive is silent on the migrants’ legal position vis-à-vis the Member State in case 
the host fails to comply. The obligation to publish a list of approved institutions is 
relevant here as well: according to Dutch case law the migrant can check the list regu-
larly to see if his or her institution is still compliant and his or her residence permit is 
not at risk.25 I doubt migrants check such lists on a regular basis. Its availability provides 
false security for the migrant.  
                                                        
21  Article 34 SRD. 
22  Article 35 SRD. 
23  Article 9 par. 3 SRD. 
24  Article 33 SRD. 
25  This follows from Dutch Council of State 30 November 2017, JV 2018/71 with note Marcel Reurs, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:3294. The Dutch list is available at: https://ind.nl/Paginas/Openbaar-register-
erkende-referenten.aspx. 
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Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive 
The ICTD applies to third-country nationals admitted in the framework of an intra-
corporate transfer as managers, specialists or trainees. This Directive sets the standards 
for their temporary labour migration of a maximum of three years, or one year for 
trainees. It’s most important asset is that it provides for some intra-EU Mobility.26 
Member States may also set up a simplified procedure for multinationals which have 
been recognised for that purpose, again in accordance with their national legislation or 
administrative practice.27 The recognition must be regularly assessed, an instruction 
missing in the SRD. Member States may require the payment of fees for handling of 
all applicants in accordance with the Directive, which fees shall not be disproportionate 
or excessive.28  
Once recognised, the multinational is facilitated with simplified procedures relating 
to the issuing of intra-corporate transferee permits, permits for long-term mobility, 
permits granted to family members of an intra-corporate transferee, and visas. Simpli-
fication shall include at least the applicant’s exemption from presenting some of the 
evidence and a fast-track admission procedure allowing intra-corporate transferee per-
mits and permits for long-term mobility to be issued within less than 90 days. Without 
success EP suggested that fast track meant that a decision should be at taken within 45 
days, but that suggestion was dropped during the negotiations.29 The recognition also 
imposes certain obligations on the multinationals, again obligations not imposed on 
the hosts of researchers or students: they shall notify to the relevant authority any mo-
dification affecting the conditions for recognition within 30 days.30 Obviously, this re-
quires a proper administration of project and human resources management. Apart 
from the fees and administrative obligations, the recognized sponsor is at risk of admi-
nistrative sanctions. Member States must provide for appropriate sanctions, including re-
vocation of recognition, in the event of failure to notify the relevant authority. In the 
event the multinational would lose the status of a recognised sponsor, the transferred 
TCN migrant worker is not protected however and is likely to lose his or her residence 
permit. Likely, but not definitely. Any decision to withdraw or to refuse to renew an 
intra-corporate transferee residence permit shall take account of the specific circum-
stances of the case and respect the principle of proportionality.31 Because the ICTD 
requires the multinational to declare it will take care of the return of the transferee, no 
right to a search period for another job in the country where one is stationed is provi-
ded for.32  
A Guildian analysis of this Directive would, in general, leave us with a sour taste 
because it does not present the migrant as an actor. The ICTD only allows for tempo-
rary migration of otherwise wanted highly skilled people and only as an ‘asset’ of the 
                                                        
26  On this see Á. Töttõs, ‘Negotiations in the Council’, and other chapters in: P. Minderhoud & T. de 
Lange, The Intra Corporate Transferee Directive, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers 2018, p. 5-18  
27  Article 11 ICTD. 
28  Article 16 ICTD. 
29  Council Document 5771/14, Amendment 69. 
30  Article 11(8) ICTD. 
31  Article 8 ICTD. 
32  Article 5(1) under c) sub iv ICTD. 
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multinational corporation, moved (and returned) across the globe, at the multinationals 
will. Albeit probably paid well (although, given the hours they might be asked to work, 
maybe not even so). Originally, the Directive prescribed that the Member States check 
on the financial health of the multinational, in order to secure continued payment of 
the transferees.33 But all prescriptions regarding the recognition, which might be con-
siderate of migrant rights, were deleted along the way. What remains creates an equi-
vocal migration management tool, with fast tracks however in which the migrant is not 
‘alone’ to regulate his or her life. Security of residence following any particular choice 
or action by the migrant under the Directive is low, this is for the multinational to 
decide on. In the Dutch case, the migration authorities prefer for these migrants to stay 
on. If the migrant and a recognised employer so desire, they can switch into a national 
highly skilled migrant status.  
Proposed Recast Blue Card Directive 
Finally, let me address the Blue Card Directive (BCD). The BCD sets standards for the 
admission of highly qualified and well earning third-country nationals. Its recast was 
submitted on 7 June 2016 and, nearly three years on, is still under negotiation.34 The 
foreseen obligation to redesign national schemes for highly skilled into a blue card 
scheme, appears to be a deal breaker.35 The proposed recast has a wider scope than the 
original BCD. While the ‘current’ Blue Card builds on the traditional demand-driven 
labour migration model, the recast allows for more hybrid labour migration schemes: 
it introduces a job search period, which is a typical supply-driven model. It is also ex-
pected to introduce a new the concept of a recognised employer to provide for fast 
track procedures. According to the proposal, the recognition procedure is to be regu-
lated at national level. Again, such procedure must be transparent and not entail dis-
proportionate or excessive administrative burden and costs for employers. The benefit 
is a fast tracked procedure (30 days maximum) and it has less evidence requirements.36  
Sanctions against its abuse are required and where the employer has been sanctio-
ned for the employment of illegally staying TCN pursuant to Directive 2009/ 52/EC 
(on employer sanctions), this may be a reason to be excluded from recognition as a 
trusted sponsor. Interestingly, if the status is refused or withdrawn this does not mean 
the Blue Card residence permit may be refused or is no longer valid, it only means that 
the application or renewal of that EU Blue Card will be done through the more tradi-
tional, more time consuming, procedures. It would make the procedure more of an 
administrative burden for the employer but would not jeopardize the migrants’ oppor-
tunity to enter and remain with this employer as a highly qualified migrant worker.  
From a migrants’ perspective, the BCD recast would be an important improve-
ment compared to the current Dutch highly skilled migration scheme, which today 
                                                        
33  T. de Lange, ‘Concluding Remarks. Is the Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive Welcoming Interna-
tional Talent?’, in: P. Minderhoud & T. de Lange, The Intra Corporate Transferee Directive, Oisterwijk: 
Wolf Legal Publishers 2018, p. 163-164. 
34  Proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly skilled employment of 7 July 2016 COM(2016) 378 final2016/0176 (COD). 
35  PART 1/2 FITNESS CHECK on EU Legislation on legal migration Brussels, 29 March 2019 
SWD(2019), 1055 final, p. 45-46. 
36  Article 12 BCD-recast proposal. 
A ‘Guildian’ Analysis of the Equivocal Trusted Sponsorship 
 
215 
offers no serious alternative in case the recognised employer falls short. In the Dutch 
case, a withdrawal of the recognition of the employer means illegality for all the highly 
skilled TCN employed by that sponsor, unless the migrants find a new recognised em-
ployer, within three months. In practice we have seen cases where it took more than 
three months for the TCNs to find out their employer was no longer recognised, alt-
hough, like with the research institutions, a list of recognised sponsors is made public. 
This happened in cases of mergers, take overs and the alike, where the employees were 
transferred to another legal entity within a group, but the employer had forgotten to 
obtain recognised sponsorship status for the new entity. Hence, the TCNs had no time 
to find another employer.37 Once a residence permit was obtained again, they had a 
‘gap’, meaning they did not have continuous legal residence and thus the counting of 
years before eligibility for permanent residence started from scratch and they were, 
again for five years, tied to an employer with trusted sponsor status. So much for their 
future professional freedom. This is obviously equivocal treatment of the otherwise so 
sought after highly skilled labour migrants. In Sweden the law was changed to avoid 
revoking the residence permit of the wanted labour migrants due to their employers 
lack of compliance.38 From a migrants’ perspective, the proposed BCD recast offers 
more protection, the recognition covers fast tracking procedures and less control but 
doesn’t tie the worker to the employer as the Dutch trusted sponsorship does. Also, 
the mobility right incorporated in the BCD, which allows BC holders to move to ano-
ther Member State without losing entitlements to long term residence, provides room 
for taking control over ones migratory and professional ambitions. Although, accor-
ding to Noronha, Indian IT workers are not prone to collectivisation,39 their collective 
call for an agreement on the recast BCD (or strike if it remains disagreed upon?) would 
possibly make for a powerful action of migrant workers in the EU.  
Some Final Thoughts 
To conclude, let me start by pointing out that few EU Member States have actually 
implemented a procedure for the recognition of employers and fast tracking procedu-
res for their wanted migrant workers. Spain, Slovakia, Italy and the Netherlands have 
it. France has been said to contemplate its use.40 The recently proposed German labour 
migration law offers expedited procedures based on an agreement between the em-
ployer and the German immigration authorities.41 This been said, I come to four final 
thoughts using the ‘Guildian’ analysis of the design of the recognised employer, or 
trusted sponsor, and whether the individual labour migrant ‘alone can regulate his or 
her life in accordance with clear rules with a degree of security as to the consequences 
                                                        
37  Dutch Council of State 30 November 2017, JV 2018/71 with note Marcel Reurs, ECLI:NL:RVS: 
2017:3294. 
38  P. Herzfeld Olsson, ‘Transposing the ICT Directive into Swedish Law – A Company Friendly Exer-
cise’, in: P. Minderhoud & T. de Lange, The Intra Corporate Transferee Directive, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal 
Publishers 2018, p. 139-154, at p. 142. 
39  Noronha et al. 2018. 
40  J. Antoons, A. Ghimis & C. Sullivan, ‘The Intra-Corporate Transfer Permit and Mobility in the Euro-
pean Union: The Business Perspective’, in: P. Minderhoud & T. de Lange, The Intra Corporate Transferee 
Directive, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers 2018, p. 67-84, at p. 78. 
41  Proposal Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetzes13 March 2019, par. 81a (p.35). 
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of any particular choice or action’. Firstly, any demand-driven labour migration scheme 
with work permits could be said to allow for an employer to have power over the 
migrant worker, hence, little is decided on ‘alone’ when work permit requirements or 
the like apply. All schemes discussed are mainly demand driven. Secondly, the recog-
nised sponsorship under the ICT and the SRD and practice in the Netherlands, increase 
the migrants dependency on the host. The BCD, as it now stands as well as the propo-
sed recast, offers more room to manoeuvre individually. It is, thus, a pity that it isn’t 
agreed upon yet. Thirdly, one must consider that highly skilled and well paid migrant 
workers are commonly perceived as not so vulnerable, able to hire a lawyer to advise 
them and able to check a website listing recognised employers. But having them rely 
on their employer for all information on, and application for, their migration status 
implies a high risk of abuse. And such abuse occurs. Future sponsorship systems 
should hence require, in some more detail, Member States to take responsibility for the 
wanted highly skilled migrants. Fourthly, and somewhat to the contrary of the previous 
conclusion, the trusted sponsorship, as an equivocal instrument of migration control, 
is a very important tool in stepping up labour migration into the European Union, not 
just in fast tracking procedures, but in allowing larger numbers of labour migrants to 
arrive without too much political upheaval. Both final points go to the heart of the 
Member States’ obligation to provide worker protection, an obligation that cannot be 
neutralised by the States’ privatisation of labour immigration control. The trusted spon-
sorship schemes should not exacerbate the migrants’ dependence on the employer. 
They should provide just fast track procedures, not instead of but as a free to choose 
alternative to otherwise also well-functioning, but lengthier, regular procedures. There 
should be nothing equivocal about that. As such, the procedure should provide the 
migrant an interesting opportunity for a true Guildian ‘professional future’ in which 
the migrant ‘alone can regulate his or her life in accordance with clear rules, with a 
degree of security as to the consequences of any particular choice or action’.  
 
